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Crisis Intelligence Branch

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


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COORDINATION OF NATIONAL WARNING AND
CRISIS INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

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Coordination of National Warning and Crisis
Intelligence Support

I - Introduction

1. The analysis and action proposals presented herein are intended to address the systemic inhibitions to more effective national warning and crisis intelligence support, that is, those factors which are not variables pertaining to one particular crisis or another. The proposals deal with a) the establishment of improved mechanisms for focusing Community warning and crisis intelligence support operations across organizational lines; b) development of a common Community alert level indicator system based on changes in target posture and capabilities rather than perception of ultimate intent; and c) reorientation of indications and warning analysis and reporting to increase support to crisis avoidance (deterrence) decisionmaking. Underlying these proposals are the following findings:

a. responsibility for warning and crisis intelligence support is, in practice, widely diffused throughout the Community and essentially lacking a coherent structure;

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b. as a result, Community components interact with one another and with intelligence users principally on a bilateral basis, there being no established central mechanism, other than the efforts of individual National Intelligence Officers, for efficiently coordinating collection, production and reporting with respect to situation-oriented* contexts across agency and program boundaries except on ad hoc basis; and

c. reliance on ad hoc procedures (which to some extent reflects analytical resource limitations), aside from their inherent inefficiency, limits the Community's capability to focus operations on developing situational contexts over an extended time frame in support of crisis avoidance** and to efficiently marshal its resources when necessary to assist in crisis management.

* The term situation is used herein to mean an evolving set of interactive political, military and, perhaps, economic conditions and events taking place within or among nations which indicates potential for alteration of an existing state of affairs and consequent impact on US interests, objectives and/or security. Situational ambiguity is uncertainty regarding the nature, significance and underlying objective of observed events resulting from gaps in available intelligence and/or the acquisition of data susceptible to divergent interpretation.

** Crisis avoidance support is the orientation of intelligence collection, analysis and reporting so as to optimize the range, selection and timing of deterrent action. options available to decisionmakers being supported.

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II. Analysis of the Problem

The Function of Warning

2. The operational impact of the conditions outlined above is to render the Community and, consequently, those it supports extremely vulnerable to the effects of ambiguity in the situational environment (particularly that clouding the motive underlying observed activity), compounded by that created by the Community itself in its internal operations and their impact on National decisionmaking authorities. Thus, the review of Community performance on the eve of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War found:

The problem of incremental analysis--especially as it applies to the current intelligence process--was also at work in the period preceding hostilities. Analysts, according to their own accounts, were often proceeding on the basis of the day's take, hastily comparing it with material received the previous day. They then produced in "assembly line fashion," items which may have reflected preceptive intuition but which accrued from a systematic consideration of an accumulated body of integrated evidence.

Divisions of labor within the Community and within individual agencies may have contributed to this problem. Separate groups of analysts may examine different aspects of the same substantive problem, with little time or opportunity to review one another's product and to integrate subsequent analysis.

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The lack of an integrated systematic approach to warning problems may also have had an unfortunate effect on the analytical product. To oversimplify somewhat, analysts, in reacting against certain indicators, tended to conceive of the problem in terms of "war" vs. "no war" rather than in terms of the "likelihood" of war. There seemed to be no system designed to encourage the analysts who were evaluating the crisis to ponder events and indicators in the light of the warning function and the need for judgments of probabilities.*

3. Where intelligence can be relied upon to provide timely and unambiguous insight into the development of a given situation and the underlying intentions and timetables of its dominant actors, the impact of the aforementioned problems is minimized, insofar as information collected speaks for itself and its implications are apparent. Historically, however, such cases are extremely rare and existence of such optimal conditions cannot be presumed as a basis for organization of intelligence support operations.

4. Therefore, the function of warning intelligence is to alert the decisionmaker to the need for consideration of action options designed to hedge against ambiguity shrouding the implications of observed phenomena with respect to U.S. security and interests. This function is particularly

* The Performance of the Intelligence Community Before the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973: A Preliminary Post Mortem Report; Intelligence Community Staff, December 1973, pp. 18-19.

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important in situations where such ambiguity may conceal an adversary's miscalculation of the potential reaction of the United States or "signals" intended to elicit a clarification of the U.S. position.

5. The act of "hedging," in the present context, is the selection and implementation of an action option (or a series thereof) calculated to have a deterrent or deflective impact on the course of an observed situation in the event the threat implications reflected by intelligence are accurate, while minimizing the cost and potential embarrassment to the United States (and the authority acting) in the event they are not. Thus, the term "action" may, depending on the context and the decisionmaker's perception, mean anything from a telephone call to an ambassador to mobilization of an army.

6. Community support of hedge action consideration by decisionmakers is time sensitive, insofar as the range of hedge options available tends to diminish with proximity to the event being hedged against, as does the opportunity for flexible application of a progression of initiatives should earlier signals not have the desired effect. In addition, the magnitude of the hedge action required for effective

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deterrence is increased to the extent its subject has become committed to his course of action and cannot extricate himself without loss. Therefore, there is a clear premium on early detection and reporting that is likely to be achieved only through continuous Community focus on the operational situations in question, as opposed to general reliance on ad hoc measures inspired by the perceived imminence or onset of a "crisis."

7. Further, it is inherent to the nature of the Intelligence-decisionmaker relationship that the operational significance of a given situation or item of information is not necessarily obvious, but rather may derive from objectives, views, and sensitive data held by the decisionmaker, but not generally apparent within the Community. In other words, a particular sequence of events or intelligence observations gains significance, as concerns the Community's level of effort and focus of warning support, primarily as it relates to how the United States, as represented by National decisionmaking authority, views that activity and what it might intend to do about it.

8. Thus, a warning and crisis intelligence support system dominated by the requirement to estimate or predict

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the ultimate objective underlying observed events or activity tends, operationally, to neglect the fact that ultimate responsibility for confronting the ambiguous implications of a particular situation belongs to the decisionmaker and not to the Community. While it is obviously desirable that the Community provide an unambiguous picture of what is happening in a given situational context and its probable significance, its inability to do so should not be permitted to result in delay or lack of warning to National authority of the need to consider hedge action requirements.

9. Given the subtlety of the warning mission, as related to hedge action, its effective fulfillment will be dependent on the Community's ability to structure the responsibility for issuance of warning and the collection and analysis support underlying such decisions so as to facilitate clear and timely definition of the hard data, uncertainties and potential implications upon which consideration of hedge action will be based. At present, however, the responsibility for issuance of warning has become merged with that for production of warning intelligence and diffused throughout the Community. No single, coherent structure exists for either systematically focusing collection and production operations on evolving warning-

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related issues or for interaction with decisionmakers being supported. To the extent such integration occurs, it is undertaken on an ad hoc basis by individual NIOs in accordance with their perceived support requirements.

10. To effect interagency coordination, the Community is largely dependent on ad hoc working groups and individual analyst and NIO initiatives, insofar as the transitory nature of specific warning and crisis-potent situations inhibits their accommodation by the predominantly functional and topical structure of Community organization. An illustration of the negative effects of this problem is provided in a case study of intelligence coverage of the ongoing Egypt-Libya conflict appended as Annex B.

11. The foregoing observation is valid with regard to collection as well as analysis and reporting. Despite increasingly effective mechanisms for management and utilization of individual collection programs and systems, the Community lacks a coherent medium for effectively focusing and coordinating coverage of specific situations on a multi-source/sensor basis.* Tasking reflective of perceived

*The Collection Coordination Facility recently established by DIA is a promising initiative in this area. However, its scope of operation is currently limited to DOD requirements and support responsibilities.

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warning requirements is currently generated by individual initiative on the part of NIOs and the various production and consumer organizations and negotiated separately with each program manager. Annex C contains a review of present collection tasking and coordination practices.

12. In the absence of coherent structure, the Community is vulnerable to the disruptive effects of uncertainty created by differing perceptions of what is occurring in the operational environment resulting from fragmentary or ambiguous intelligence (situational ambiguity). Specifically, the conclusions and predictive estimates derived by each agency from its independent assessment of available information are influenced by those of sister agencies which may differ. Given the psychological deterrent to "crying wolf," an impetus toward consensus formation is created, generally aimed at negotiation of a mutually acceptable position rather than an integrated, Community reanalysis of all available data. Since the findings of the individual agencies, as well as those of interagency consensus forums and the DCI/NIO, are simultaneously and independently directed at decisionmakers in Community reporting, the effect on the latter is to compound uncertainty, thereby inhibiting establishment of a clear basis for hedge action consideration. In short, where all perceive themselves to be responsible for issuance of warning, in effect no one is.

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13. The preceding is not intended as an argument in favor of suppression of divergent views or the creation of a false impression of clear perception. The point is that, since developing international threat situations, especially in their early stages, will invariably be characterized by ambiguity shrouding the actual intentions of the principal actors, the only real alternative to timely hedge action against unresolvable ambiguity is, in effect, to do nothing. Where the warning intelligence process becomes driven by the need to accurately predict what is going to happen, the Community, in effect, directs its efforts toward findings which will prove to be either right or wrong. This contradicts the purpose of warning in contemplation of hedge action, the object of which is essentially to avoid being either right or wrong by altering the course of perceived threat development or at least minimizing its impact.

14. In this regard, it should be noted that the range of hedge action options available to the decisionmaker, particularly in the earlier stages of a developing crisis, will invariably be greater than the number of warning decision options available to the intelligence officer contemplating the implications of an ambiguous threat situation. This means that a delay in warning until a "war"- "no war" type prediction can be made would inhibit the former's

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scope of possible action in putsuit of crisis avoidance. In addition to alerting the decisionmaker to the need for consideration of hedge action, therefore, the function of warning intelligence is to provide him the insights into the operational situation at issue necessary to selection of the action option(s) most appropriate in terms of potential effectiveness, cost and risk.

15. The subtleties inherent in the above are extremely difficult to translate into analytical guidance at the intelligence production level, dependent as they are on active interaction between decisionmaker and senior (warning) intelligence authority. This effort is greatly complicated by the lack of a common structure in which the operations of the Community can be oriented toward support of hedge action consideration requirements across organizational boundaries. Because, in practice, no specific focus is established by common Community authority, warning objectives generally adopted are those which would have the greatest operational impact and could be most clearly postulated, i.e., the ultimate potential threat posed by the circumstances or activity being observed.

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16. The problem inherent in I&W analysis and production thus focused is that it tends to subsume responsibility for determining whether warning should be issued. Thus, an analytical element examining data to determine whether A is going to attack B is obligated to relate its findings to that hypothesis and, in the presence of inconclusive intelligence, the process becomes vulnerable to the contradiction noted above (paragraph 13) and consequent inability to provide timely warning in contemplation of hedge action. More important, however, the items of intelligence and kinds of analyses relevant to determination of the reality and imminence of an ultimate threat are not necessarily the same as those most useful in determining whether National authority should be alerted to the need for consideration of hedge action against that threat, particularly when a premium is placed on early notification so as to reduce the magnitude of action required for effective deterrence.

Crisis Management Support

17. It is possible to frame a definition of "crisis" by example, but extremely difficult to postulate a functionally useful operational description. In practice, crises are aberrations in normal agency activity requiring an extraordinary level of operations in the affected areas of coverage

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which, in turn, necessitates activation of ad hoc procedures and temporary reallocation of resources. At the conclusion of the crisis, the status quo ante is generally restored. This is due both to resource limitations (particularly analytical) and to changes in situational context from crisis to crisis which engender different expertise and resource requirements.

18. Community support procedures following the onset of a crisis exhibit the same characteristics of diffused responsibility ascribed earlier to the pre-crisis indications and warning environment. Insofar as activation of crisis management procedures is dependent upon the existence and common perception of an external stimulus, i.e., the cause of the crisis, they are vulnerable both to differing perceptions of the significance and requirements of observed events resulting from ambiguities in available intelligence and to the lag in operational effectiveness characteristic of ad hoc action during periods of stress. Crisis support measures, moreover, are taken independently by each organization involved, and there is no coordination mechanism at the Community level other than action undertaken by the NIO involved in support of the DCI. Beyond recently introduced procedures for integrated situation reporting (NISR), crisis

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related reporting to National decisionmaking authorities is conducted separately by each participating agency and the DCI/NIO.

19. Activation of Community crisis management support procedures only after a crisis has begun or its imminence generally perceived precludes effective operational linkage with the indications and warning process, thereby making the augmented collection and processing capabilities characteristic of the former unavailable to support hedge action consideration in the interest of crisis avoidance. In addition, it is apparent that the warning and crisis phases of a given situation are not operationally separable, insofar as the first does not end when the second begins, but merely transfers its point of focus to the future implications of crisis-related events. An example of this phenomenon occurred during the 1973 Middle East war wherein the warning phase preceding the Arab attack on Israel was immediately followed by a second warning phase concerned with the prospect of active Soviet intervention in the conflict.

20. Therefore, it would appear logical that mechanisms and procedures for provision of indications and warning intelligence support to national decisionmakers during pre-

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crisis periods be designed to also coordinate support during periods of active crisis management. While the requirement for ad hoc augmentation during crisis periods is inescapable, for the reasons noted earlier, the aforementioned structure would provide a baseline capability to make transition from warning to crisis operations smoother and more efficient, as well as creating the flexibility necessary to permit expansion of support to hedge action consideration in the extended pre-crisis period.

III. Conclusions and Recommendations

21. The preceding analysis indicates that the principal barriers to more effective Community performance in warning and crisis management support operations are the de facto diffusion of responsibility for performance of these missions within the Community and the consequent absence of a hierarchical structure for coordinating agency operations in these areas, for decisionmaking with respect to the issuance of warning, and for coherent interaction with decisionmakers being supported. Barring fundamental restructuring of Community organization and operations, remedial action would appear best directed toward the development of Community mechanisms and procedures designed to effectively coordinate

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the warning and crisis-related operations of component organizations and to integrate their product within a framework yielding a coherent stream of intelligence support to decisionmakers.

22. In particular, such mechanisms should provide a channel for bidirectional interaction between the Principal Warning Authorities and Community intelligence collection and production elements for the purpose of a) providing timely substantive support to fulfillment of the former's responsibility for issuance of warning to National authority; b) focusing the warning objectives against which the latter are conducting collection and analysis operations, particularly with respect to operational contexts in which a need for decisionmaker consideration of hedge action may be indicated; and c) ameliorating the disruptive effects on Community operations of restricted dissemination of sensitive intelligence and operations data pertinent to the analysis of warning and crisis related intelligence.

Joint DCI-DOD Initiatives

23. The senior Intelligence authorities responsible for the issuance of warning to National authorities (Principal

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Warning Authorities) in the context discussed in the preceding analysis, are the DCI and the Director, DIA acting as senior Intelligence advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. While the functions and responsibilities of each, in their full scope, differ widely, there is a broad area of convergence with respect to mutual requirements to provide warning and crisis management support to National decisionmaking and command authority. Moreover, measures taken to develop or improve focus and coordination of intelligence operations independently for each warning authority will not yield the desired effectiveness, insofar as a significant degree of diffusion would persist, given the existence of two points of focus and coordination.

It is, therefore recommended that development and operation of mechanisms and procedures for coordination of warning and crisis intelligence operations on a Community basis be undertaken jointly by the DCI and Director, DIA.

National Indications and Warning System

24. The principal substantive recommendation made is for the establishment of a National Indications and Warning System (NIWS) comprised of the following procedural and structural components:

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a. a procedural system for designation of National Warning Issues designed to provide early visibility to developing situational contexts which exhibit potential for adverse impact on US security or interests and, therefore, require focused Community coverage, perhaps over an extended time span, in support of the Principal Warning Authorities and National decisionmaking authority;

b. a common Community structure and set of procedural guidelines for substantive intelligence reporting against active National Warning Issues designed to facilitate substantive integration of multi-agency reporting and maintenance of continuity in situational development;

c. an Intelligence Alert Level indication system designed to reflect changes in target posture and rate of situational change rather than perception of the likelihood or imminence of an event requiring issuance of warning; and

d. a permanent operational element designed to serve as a medium of interaction between the Principal Warning Authorities and components comprising the

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Community's intelligence collection, analysis and production capabilities for the purpose of coordinating and focusing coverage of developing warning situations and active crisis management contexts.

25. The above are described in greater detail in Annex A. Collectively, their principal objective is the development of a integrated Community system which focuses the operations of line production elements and underlying collection assets, with respect to evolving situations indicating potential threat to US security or interests, so as to optimize fulfillment of the Principal Warning Authorities' responsibility to National authority, for the timely issuance of warning.

26. With respect to internal Community indications and warning intelligence production operations, the proposed NIWS is designed to:

a. provide individual production agencies the capability to progressively alert consumers and other Community elements to warning related situational developments without the constraint of having to predict ultimate outcome in the presence of unresolvable situational ambiguity (i.e., issue warning);

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b. structure analysis and reporting related to specific National Warning Issues so as to emphasize the direction and rate of situational development during the time frame which the Issue is active;

c. by means of a National Warning Issue subsystem, provide a vehicle for reflecting the concerns and warning intelligence support requirements of decision-making and Principal Warning Authorities directly into the collection and production process on a timely basis and for insuring awareness of these concerns and requirements by all Community elements involved in related intelligence collection and production;

27. The proposed NIWS is designed to require no significant change in the current division of operational and management responsibilities within the Community. Thus, the organizational component of NIWS would serve primarily as a coordinative instrument of the Principal Warning Authorities (including, by extension, the NIO organization) for

a. providing to Community production elements timely guidance concerning analytical and reporting requirements related to specific situational indicators which would underlie a determination to issue warning in contemplation of hedge action;

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b. determining, upon establishment of a National Warning Issue, the current Community collection and production posture vis-a-vis the underlying situation, the capabilities to alter or expand that posture, and the impact of such changes on coverage of other intelligence targets;

c. maintaining, over the operational life of a National Warning Issue, comparative continuity of the intelligence indicators of changes in target capability and posture as related to the sources or sensors from which they were derived in order to optimize collection coverage of future changes and to estimate the prospects, in advance of warning issuance, that future intelligence collection will reduce or resolve existing situational (intent) ambiguity;

d. advising Principal Warning Authorities of the occurrence of significant changes in the direction or rate of situational development with respect to active Warning Issues, recommending appropriate changes in analytical guidance or collection posture designed to determine whether observed developments require the issuance of warning; and

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e. representing the Principal Warning Authorities in coordinating Community support to National authorities during periods of active crisis management.

28. The component itself would undertake no substantive intelligence production with respect to National Warning Issues, nor would it engage in resource management. Interaction with Community collection and production programs would be effected through established management authorities and mechanisms. Similarly, during active crisis management periods, the components operations would be conducted in conjunction with the mechanisms established by the various agencies and program managers for support of crisis operations.

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

[REDACTED]
Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence
Community

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FROM

: [REDACTED]
Director of Performance Evaluation and
Improvement

VIA

: Mr. John N. McMahon
Associate Deputy to the DCI for the
Intelligence Community

SUBJECT

: National Coordination of Warning and
Crisis Management Support Operations

1. The Crisis Intelligence Branch has prepared an analysis of the basic problems and requirements of National warning and crisis management support, copy of which is appended hereto as Tab A. We have been circulating the draft paper informally to key Community personnel for comments (Tab B).

2. The proposed memorandum to NFIB (Tab C) summarizes our analysis and recommendations and is designed to effect the transition from conceptual to implementation phase as a follow-on to our DCI Crisis Advisor initiative. The underlying problem analysis is also serving as the basis of our input to PRM-11 on warning and crisis management.

3. Please note that, in sum, our analysis and resulting action proposals represent a significant departure from traditional Community practice and are likely, therefore, to be somewhat controversial. Specifically:

--warning and crisis management support operations would be integrated, with greater emphasis placed on the former in pursuit of crisis avoidance;

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--emphasis is placed on creation of centralized Community warning and crisis management mechanisms as opposed to interagency committees and task forces reflective of the Community viewed as a confederation; and

--the issuance of warning based on intelligence is viewed as a personal, command responsibility of the DCI and the J-2, JCS rather than as an analytical or production mission of Community agencies; therefore, the principal function of Community warning and crisis management intelligence capabilities is support of these "Principal Warning Authorities" rather than direct, independent support of National decisionmaking authorities on a bilateral or consensual basis.

4. In addition, while implementation of those elements of our proposed action program which are procedural in nature would have no resource impact, development of the envisioned Community coordination element would require people and funds, either new or reprogrammed. The extent of such requirements would be determined by the chosen location of the facility and the basis on which it was directed to operate. We do not--in any case--envision a large-scale development or operations effort.

5. Given the broad nature of our proposed action program and the criticality of the Community operations it addresses, we would like to obtain insight into your's and the DCI's desires and objectives in this area to assure we are not operating at variance to them. Consequently, Tab C is submitted, at this point, as a strawman for that purpose.

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Attachments:

- Tab A - Coordination of National Warning and Crisis Intelligence Support, dated 11 Feb. 1977
- Tab B - Note from VADM Inman re Coordination of National Warning and Crisis Intelligence Support
- Tab C - Memo for NFIB

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
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I appreciate having the opportunity to read your draft paper on Coordination of National Warning and Crises Intelligence Support. I believe the analysis and action proposals presented therein have merit and should be further pursued by the DCI and the Community.


Sincerely,



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B. R. INMAN
Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy
Vice Director for Plans, Operations
and Support
Defense Intelligence Agency

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Intelligence Community Staff
Room 6E04
Central Intelligence Agency
Langley, Virginia

TAB B


In addition to the preceding note from VADM Inman, written comments from M [redacted] NSA, and Captain John Butts, ACOS (Intelligence), CINCLANT are currently expected. Copies of the draft paper have, thus far, also been provided to:

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General Lew Allen, DIRNSA [redacted]
Mr. Richard Lehman, D/DCI/NI

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MEMORANDUM FOR: National Foreign Intelligence Board
SUBJECT : Coordination of National Warning
and Crisis Intelligence Support

1. A major area of concern to successive Presidents, the Congress and the public is the apparently inadequate performance of the Intelligence Community in providing timely and effective warning to National decisionmaking authorities of impending events and developing crises in the international sphere which vitally affect the nation's interests and security. While the Community's performance of its intelligence support mission during crisis periods has been significantly better, there remain areas of needed improvement, particularly with respect to operational integration of warning and crisis management support capabilities.

2. An analysis conducted by my staff, assisted by the post-mortem reviews of Community performance in major crises of the past decade, has identified a number of fundamental problem areas which must be addressed by a comprehensive action program. Specifically, functional responsibility for indications and warning intelligence and crisis management support is necessarily diffused throughout the Community. However, there currently exists no central mechanism, other than ad hoc task forces established after a crisis has begun or its imminence generally perceived, for integration of Community operations to optimum effect and for focusing support to the President and the Special Coordination Committee.

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3. The absence of a coherent structure creates high vulnerability to the disruptive effects of ambiguity caused by differing perceptions among Community elements, as illustrated on the eve of the 1973 Middle East conflict, of the significance and portent of available intelligence relating to a developing international situation. These effects are compounded by:

- the lack of common operating procedures for coordination of intelligence collection and production operations relating to particular warning or crisis contexts;

- the lack of a common information base, particularly at the analytical level, due in great measure to excessive compartmentation and restrictive dissemination of sensitive data; and

- perhaps most important, the absence of an effective channel of interaction between National-level consumers of warning intelligence and the Community's production elements for use in timely adjustment of the focus of intelligence analysis and reporting operations to support warning requirements keyed to potential U.S. crisis avoidance initiatives rather than to the detection of predefined crisis thresholds to which the U.S. would presumably react.

4. It must be operationally assumed that ambiguity will be present in all developing warning and crisis situations, whether resulting from limitations in our intelligence capabilities, active deception by the actors involved, tight security or some combination thereof. This being the case, we must also assume that, if timely crisis avoidance action is to be taken, the SCC will at times be advising and the President acting on the basis of incomplete and ambiguous data; in short, he will be hedging the risks.

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5. Therefore, an action program directed at the problems discussed above must have as its primary objective the elimination of those characteristics of Community operations which tend to introduce artificial distortions and delays in the evaluation and reporting of warning-related intelligence so that the elements of uncertainty surrounding a developing international situation and its implications may be accurately isolated for timely SCC and Presidential consideration. Further, we must:

- a. develop procedures that will ease the psychological inhibitions to threat prediction in the presence of ambiguous intelligence indications (the "cry wolf" syndrome);
- b. provide a channel for continuous interaction between current intelligence analysts and the National policy and decision-making apparatus so as to better focus the former's operations on specific warning issues of concern to the latter;
- c. take measures to ameliorate the disruptive effects of compartmentation and restrictive dissemination of sensitive data on the intelligence evaluation process;
- d. optimize the application of intelligence collection, processing and analysis resources to warning and crisis management issues through continuous coordination on a centralized, Community basis; and
- e. functionally integrate Community capabilities and procedures for warning and crisis management support so as to provide a basis for smooth and flexible transition from normal to crisis mode operations while reducing reliance on ad hoc and standby mechanisms.

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6. In pursuit of the foregoing objectives, I propose the following steps be taken:

a. establish a permanent, continuously functioning Community warning and crisis management coordination element to serve, in conjunction with NSC Staff, as the operational intelligence support base for the SCC. Specific functions of this element would be:

(1) to focus Intelligence Community collection, analysis and reporting on developing international situations so as to provide the SCC and the President timely insight and data in support of potential crisis avoidance initiatives;

(2) to serve as the medium of interaction between SCC principals and their staffs and Community collection and production elements for the purpose of providing the former a single point of entry and response for intelligence requirements bearing on active warning and crisis issues and the latter a source of consumer feedback to assist in focusing warning analysis on parameters most relevant to policy or action initiatives under consideration;

(3) to provide a common point of interaction for Community elements conducting operations with respect to active warning issues in order to eliminate delay and duplication of effort resulting from bilateral coordination practices; to make timely identification of conflicts in requirements and priorities for resolution by superior authority;

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(4) during periods of active crisis, serve as the National crisis management support center, coordinating crisis-related Community operations in support of the SCC; provide facilities and support for the National Intelligence Situation Report task force.

b. Implement a system for designation of National Warning

Issues designed to:

(1) provide early visibility to developing international situations which exhibit potential for impact on U.S. security or political interests;

(2) serve as a procedural mechanism for systematically tying together the diverse Community collection, analysis, and reporting operations targeted against developing threat situations;

(3) focus intelligence consumers' attention on situations or observed unusual events which may ultimately bear warning implications leading to crisis avoidance initiatives;

c. Develop common Community procedural guidelines for substantive intelligence reporting against active National Warning Issues in order to:

(1) facilitate consumer integration of available intelligence and evaluative findings across the spectrum of multi-agency reporting against warning issues;

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(2) provide for maintenance of continuity in warning reporting so as to make apparent to the consumer the direction in which a situation is evolving and the relative rate of development, rather than simply reporting the latest intelligence acquisitions and evaluative findings; and

d. implement a Community Intelligence Alert Level Indication System designed to reflect changes in target posture and rate of situational change rather than perception of the likelihood or imminence of an event requiring issuance of warning. Such a system would be primarily intended to permit a Community production element to alert other agencies and consumers to developing threat situations and unusual target activities without becoming vulnerable to the psychological pressures attendant to warning prediction in the presence of intent ambiguity.

7. I direct that a special working group representing NFIB member agencies active in the current intelligence and indications and warning fields be formed under the direction of the , to develop the initiatives outlined above and such others considered to beneficially address the problems and objectives discussed herein. As a related matter, the working group should examine the structural and operational implications of warning and crisis management support functions conducted in a wartime rather than peacetime environment.

STANSFIELD TURNER
Admiral, U.S. Navy

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TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE
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REMARKS:		
<p>This is to be considered a draft in view of the IC number on the memo to Adm. <input type="text"/> I will change the number if <input type="text"/> does not make any changes and signs this memo.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Thanks</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><input type="text"/></p> <p><i>Tab A is less Annex's Box</i></p>		
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